In 1795 the Bristol physician, Thomas Beddoes, introduced his edition of John Brown's The elements of medicine with the remark "It was not unusual for Brown's disciples to disagree, when they were called upon for a strict interpretation of his principal tenets."' Over a hundred years later, the London doctor Benjamin Ward
life of his father which appeared nine years later in 1804, accused Beddoes of using "scanty material" and of stigmatizing his father in the following manner:
... his want of medical erudition confidently affirmed; his composition, both in Latin and English, vilified; the extent of his practice questioned; he is arraigned of bigotry and pedantry in his youth, and ofirreligion and arrogance in advanced life ... his person ... is likened to that of the clumsy buffoon in Cervantes . .6.
It is in the first place to be observed, that the two biographical accounts of Dr Brown given by Dr Beddoes and by William Cullen Brown, the son of Dr Brown, contain so many erroneous statements, so many representations quite at variance with facts, that they may, without injustice, be pronounced to be rather agreeable romances, and extraordinary pieces of fiction, than genuine narratives of matters of fact.15 In spite oftheir differences, all three authors agree that during his first four or five years studying medicine at Edinburgh, Brown was admitted free by the Beddoes saw matters rather differently and suggested that Brown "seems to have given in to the most dangerous ofvices".17 Also during these years, his son relates, Brown, in consequence ofhis menial position, had to render himself "agreeable to those on whom his livelihood depended".18 One of these was the popular and well-connected professor of medicine, William Cullen. Brown's son represented Cullen as the exploiter of his father's talents. He wrote that "Dr Cullen, who was extremely deficient in classical erudition, conceived the idea of turning his pupil's intimate knowledge of Latin to his own permanent advantage." 19 Beddoes took a similar view. John Thomson, however, had a rather different perception of the relationship:
It is stated, more or less distinctly, both by Dr Beddoes and by Dr C. Brown, that Dr Cullen found Mr John Brown's knowledge of the Latin language useful, and made him a sort of amanuensis or Latin secretary. This is entirely a piece ofinvention. The only capacity in which Dr Cullen employed Mr John Brown was as tutor or private teacher to his children, to assist them in the preparation of their lessons and their Latin exercises. 20 Thomson further professed incomprehension that Beddoes could possibly think that a man as great as Cullen would employ, as an amanuensis, a man who was little more than an adept at the art of "low buffoonery".21
The events following Brown's association with Cullen are the subject of striking differences of interpretation among the biographers. According Society and in the Royal Infirmary.29 There can be no doubt either of the rancour which the controversy generated on both sides, nor the violence with which the dispute was pursued. Brown's son accused "Dr Cullen and his abettors" of being "ungenerous and disgraceful" and of attempting to "crush the doctrine, and involve its author and his family in ruin".30 Beddoes, a trifle less sympathetic, noted "as the Cullenian hypotheses were sinking into disrepute, many of the ablest students resorted to the standard of Brown, . . . it was joined also by the most idle and dissolute."31 One ofhis pupils informs me that when he found himselflanguid, he sometimes placed a bottle of whisky in one hand, and a phial of laudanum on the other; and that, before he began his lecture, he would take forty or fifty drops oflaudanum in a glass ofwhisky; repeating the dose four or five times during the lecture. Between the effects of these stimulants and voluntary exertion, he soon waxed warm, and by degrees his imagination was exalted into phrenzy.37
His son, however, denied the charges of gross indulgence and claimed that his father's "intemperate excesses" were "egregiously exaggerated", and that "many ridiculous stories of the frolics committed by him in a state of ebriety have been circulated at his expense."38 But Bruno, as even his son admitted, "was rather free in his religious sentiments" and also had unconventional political allegiances. Brown was still in Scotland and attempting to attract orthodox students away from the University and particularly from Cullen. Its representation of Brunonianism as a methodically-achieved dogmatic system based on Newtonian principles was, therefore, a locally-tuned intervention into the traditions of Edinburgh medicine. Not everyone, however, saw its systematic nature to be the essential feature of Brunonianism. Indeed, one of the earliest published responses to Brown's work ignored altogether these pretensions to a systemic character. This attack was the anonymous Observations on the medicalpractice ofDr. Brown, which appeared in 1788.
It was almost certainly written by a regular, English, provincial practitioner.50 For this author, the crucial part of the Brunonian doctrine was not its use of philosophical principles, but what he perceived as its radical therapeutic recommendations: in particular, that stimulants should be employed in inflammatory fevers. The author of the Observations was, medically speaking, a self-confessed conservative. He valued tradition and orthodoxy on the grounds that they necessarily embodied hundreds of years of accumulated experience. Further, orthodox wisdom was not primarily embodied in institutions or in books but in what physicians actually did at the bedside. Anything other than the most limited therapeutic innovation was, therefore, bad medicine. Eclecticism, gradual change, and deference to authority were themselves the signs that medicine was on its slow but sure path to "further improvement"..51 Thus for him the essence of Brown's work was its injunction to break with traditional practice. It was this which identified Brunonianism as a doctrine of a "singular and extraordinary nature". The most "conspicuous" part of this heresy was the recommendation that large doses of laudanum should be employed in fevers. This was a doctrine, the author remarked, which "surely, cannot but strike almost every person as uncommon and immoderate".52 From this author's position, Brown's teaching represented "Credulity, fashion, the love of novelty, and a propensity to rush from one extreme to another".53 Not surprisingly the author underwrote tradition by invoking authority, referring to the "learned and ingenious . .. Dr. Percival"; "that part of Dr. Cullen's works where he has so very ingeniously and satisfactorily discussed this subject"; "that truly ingenious man, Mr. John Hunter"; "those diligent observers of nature, Hippocrates and Sydenham"; "the elegant Celsus"; the "illustrious names, Cullen, Duncan and Gregory"; "that very learned and sagacious ... Dr. George Fordyce", the "celebrated Sir John Pringle"; "the eminent Hoffmann" and, finally, "that celebrated professor, bright ornament of the medical profession, Dr. Cullen".54 All of these great figures, he noted, avoided stimulants in inflammatory fevers, therefore, he deduced, this must be proper practice. Such prescribing, he said, "observe[d] due bounds" and "avoid [ed] those extravagant sallies which are generally looked upon to be the principal and leading marks of all extremes".55
The author thus identified himself with orthodoxy, and defined orthodoxy itself as traditional, unspectacular practice and cautious innovation. He argued that it was therapeutic innovation or, worse, therapeutic radicalism which brought the profession into disrepute. In the years around the turn of the century such activity was increasingly seen by regulars as the distinguishing sign of a populist, a flagrant self-advertiser, or even a quack. The Observations, therefore, did not represent Brown as an inside reformer, as the Inquiry had done, but as a dangerous outsider, a subverter of long-standing tradition. Such a response to Brunonianism might be expected from a provincial, English, surgeon-apothecary. Garnett, a radical, had used the concept of excitability to present a view of life similar to that described by Beddoes. Since he did not actually produce an interpretation of the Brunonian system I have not dealt with him here. On this intriguing figure and for a bibliography [which] ... will be found to be perhaps more necessary to the action of excitability than the nervous."82
In the light of Morrison's explication of Brunonianism it is possible to offer a conjecture about the origin of his views. He was probably a London surgeon, and almost certainly a direct or distant disciple of John Hunter. Within the Hunterian school, the starting points of anatomical and physiological investigation were the existence of an autonomous and unknowable vital principle, the centrality of organization, and the importance of the blood and the vascular network. The methods of investigation were anatomical dissection and experiment; and the aims were, as Morrison put it, to trace "effects discernible in nature ... to their great First Cause".83
For Morrison, therefore, Brunonianism represented the very antithesis of all these things: it negated the importance of anatomy, it was materialist, irreligious, and thus potentially productive of the very worst social consequences. As he put it, The general conclusions of the Brunonian system lead to the most gross and false ideas of the nature of life and mind. The magnitude of this last objection, both in a physical and a moral point of view, is deserving of particular attention. The deplorable consequences which have arisen to society from the propagation of opinions connected with such erroneous notions, more especially in a neighbouring country, is too fresh in the minds of everyone to require repetition.84 For James Jackson senior, a Boston physician, writing on the Brunonian system in 1809, its essential features seemed to be ofa rather different sort. In the early nineteenth century, educated Boston physicians saw themselves as the source of light in a country ofmedical darkness. Hostile to systematizing ofall kinds, they portrayed themselves as the custodians of cautious, empirical, and sceptical medicine. They identified medical progress with the clinics of London and Paris, and with the gradual accumulation of knowledge by means of the bedside description of disease and the labours of the post-mortem room.85 Thus on the very first page of his account of Brunonianism, Jackson wrote that, at a time "when the wisest physicans had already entered the path of truth, that of observation, experience and induction; the path which Hippocrates and Sydenham had trod with so much success; and at a period when all were desirous to follow in this path ... Brown ... declared, that by the discovery of one principle he was able to explain all the secrets of physiology and medicine." In so doing, he "imitated all theorists in distorting all the other phenomena of nature".86 Jackson saw as the essence of Brunonianism its methodological prescriptions which contained an idea "directly in opposition" to "the science of medicine".87 "According to Brown," Jackson wrote, "it is useless to record the phenomena of disease, to collate and compare cases; for these phenomena, these symptoms, are fallacious."88 All this, he wrote, was contrary to "the plan of observation and experience ... by which some men in all ages have been qualified to render more or less service to the sick, in spite of the various systems which the fashions of various ages have rendered popular."89 Thus a single medical principle was both the keystone and the fundamental flaw in Brunonianism. Excitability was nothing more than a speculative hypothesis, "the properties [of living things] . . . are discoverable only by observation and experiment."90 The dangers of Brunonianism were all too obvious: it was simple, whereas experience taught that medicine was complex. It indulged indolence and discouraged medical men "from poring over the observations of others"..91
Systematizing had led Brown to egregious errors. It was possible to conclude from Brown's system that "there cannot be any such thing as a strictly local disease." This, Jackson said, was "stargazing".92 Jackson, a man trained in London and Paris hospital medicine, was, of course, highly sympathetic to the idea that all diseases were local.
It is hardly surprising to find such a reading of Brown in this Boston physician. For him, the essence of Brunonianism was its method, the erection of a system of medicine on philosophical principles. Here That the soul is constantly necessary to the motion of the body we readily admit, but the argument is pushed too far, when it is supposed that these motions are supported by the power of the soul alone; for it appears that motions, excited by the impulse of external bodies, are absolutely necessary to that support.'IN "In . . considering the nervous system as the seat of his excitability", Thomson continued, "Dr Brown's opinions ... were derived from, or modelled upon, those ofhis preceptor."'0' This, Thomson averred, was the import of Cullen's sentence, "The power of excitement ... distinguishes the vital solid ... but the brain, as uniting the whole nervous system has peculiar functions upon which the rest is dependent."'02 However, although Thomson represented Brown as having taken the idea of a single vital principle in the nervous system from Cullen, Thomson was equally concerned to show that Cullen, unlike Brown, really believed in three vital powers. Cullen, Thomson wrote, was "at great pains to distinguish between the sentient power or irritability of the nervous fibres,-the moving power ... of the muscular fibres,-and the animal or innervatory power or energy of the brain."'103 Only once, said Thomson, did Cullen "somewhat unguardedly" comprehend the three powers under one common term.104
It was this unguarded moment which was the source of Brown's idea of a single vital power: excitability. Why was Thomson at such pains to represent Cullen as having really posited three vital principles, which Brown stole and conflated into one? Brown, said Thomson, by using only one principle could draw the conclusion that "sense, motion, the mental functions, and the passions, . . . are all produced ... by mechanical impulse."'05
Thomson, in other words, accused Brown of using only one principle since he believed mental and corporeal functions to be identical. He was, in other words, a materialist. It was for this reason that Thomson represented Cullen as the teacher of three vital principles, one of which was the origin of mental operations. Thomson, the Whig, member of the Edinburgh establishment, former pupil and friend of Dugald Stewart, was imputing stout religious orthodoxy to the Edinburgh professoriate. Thomson's biography contains no suggestion that Cullen was a materialist. Accusations of this sort, however, had been bandied about in earlier years.106 What Thomson saw as central to Brown's system was the abuse of an unguarded remark by a great professor.
In a later passage, Thomson performed an almost identical piece of surgery on the texts. Once again he identified Brown as a materialist, excused Cullen from such an accusation, and simultaneously pointed to plagiarism on Brown's part. Brown's view, said Thomson, quoting him, was that all stimuli act by "evident impulse". 107 Thomson argued that Brown had pilfered the idea from Cullen, who, in another unguarded moment no doubt, "seems to have taken [it] incautiously from Mr Locke."108 Brown stole the idea from the following passage of Cullen's: "we know" wrote Cullen "of no other action of bodies on each other but that of impulse." 109 Such a passage, however, being open to misconstruction as materialist, Thomson added that Dr Cullen "seems to have been aware that the supposition of the phenomena of living systems, being produced by the operation ofimpulse alone, is founded upon a partial consideration of these phenomena."'"10 Thomson then quoted the appropriate passage to prove that Cullen really did not believe "an hypothesis which . . . [explains] all the actions produced in the animal economy by mechanical impulse.'
And so Thomson went on, demonstrating Brown's plagiarism by juxtaposing passages from his works with passages from Cullen which meant, Thomson said, exactly the same thing. For instance, Brown's assertion that "Predisposition to disease is a middle state of Excitement between perfect health and disease", was, Thomson averred, identical to Cullen's view "that health may deviate, on either side, from the standard without passing to the opposite state, that of disease."1 12 Similarly, Brown's distinction between direct debility and indirect debility was recognized by Cullen in his account of "repeated excitement ... wearing out the system", and his statement that ".such is the constitution of the nervous system that every unusual degree ofexcitement is followed by a proportional degree of collapse." 113 There remained for Brown, said Thomson, "only the merit of having applied the term[sJ"."14
There was, however, one area in which Thomson represented Brown's system as quite unlike that of Cullen's. Brown, according to Thomson, supposed that all the "morbid conditions of the different organs and functions" could be reduced to "two opposite conditions of the animal economy"."15 Cullen by contrast, Thomson said, had taught a complex pathological doctrine based on the concept of a variety of possible proximate causes. The reasons for Thomson's reading of the texts in this fashion relate to his occupation as a surgeon and his interest in general pathology. By the early nineteenth century, the surgeons in Edinburgh had eroded much ofthe power of the physicians, and in doing so they had gained entry into the traditional areas of practice claimed by them. This collapse of the old order was both institutional and intellectual. Thomson Thomson's bid to unite medicine and surgery. Local and general disease were the objects ofstudy ofthe same discipline, pathology, and the focus ofclinical attention for physician and surgeon alike. But it was Brown's view, he said, quoting him, that local and general disease "differ in every essential respect".120 Thomson's reading of Brown as hostile to the concept of local disease went further than this, however. According to Thomson, Brown had removed a whole class oflocal diseases, the inflammations, from the provenance of the surgeon, and stated they were a consequence of general dysfunction and thus properly within the sphere ofthe physician. Thomson then noted that perusal of Cullen's First lines would "leave but little doubt as to the source from which Dr Brown's opinion ... had been derived".12' This, however, was a reading of Brown similar to the one which imputed materialism to him. On the one hand, Thomson showed that Brown's views were mischievously derived from Cullen; and then he demonstrated that Cullen, like himself, actually held a rather different opinion. In this case, Thomson suggested that Cullen provided a far more sophisticated account ofthe relation oflocal to general disease which did not, in fact, privilege general disease over local.
Thomson then went on to give an account of the Brunonian practitioner's role after he had decided that a disease was a general disturbance. According to Thomson, the Brunonian practitioner had then only to discover whether the disorder was one of vigour or debility. Once For Thomson, Brown's speculations "had their origin in personal spite, arising out of wounded vanity". In turn "the malignant and rancorous animosity displayed in the writings . . . take away the pleasure which might have been derived from the manifestation ofsuch talent as he had evinced."126 For Thomson, Brown's system was derived in its essentials from Cullen or, as in the case of the use of stimulants, "in a desire to contradict precepts inculcated by Dr Cullen in his lectures and writings".'27 All else was dross, jargon and neologisms, or worthless and dangerous prescription. It was a materialist system, void of surgical or pathological value. Thomson's perceptions of the proper nature of the theory and practice of medicine, with all that they entailed for the ordering of society, were those which were valued by the Edinburgh establishment. In 1831 he was made the first professor of pathology in the University.
Thomson, however, did not dispose of Brunonianism for good. In the nineteenth century a number of authors came to Brown's defence. One of these was the English physician, Benjamin Ward Richardson, whose biographical history of medicine, 122 Ibid., p. 306. Richardson was in many respects the archetypal cultured Victorian doctor. From a relatively humble beginning he achieved great success. He was a gentleman (knighted indeed), broadly learned and a lover of history and the classics. He was also a devout man in an age in which the biological sciences, which for him evidenced the existence of a Deity, were-in T. H. Huxley's evolutionism or Michael Foster's experimental physiology-threatening a new materialism. Richardson's vitalism was part of his theology. Richardson believed in a supreme being, and held medicine to be one of the oldest and most humane arts, devoted to the relief of suffering. In reading Brown as a vitalist, he was creating a single, ageless medical profession and attributing to it Victorian conceptions of humanity and piety. For him the greatest profession could not be, since its historical beginning, anything other than learned and pious. As he put it in another context, "No medical man can be a materialist." 134 That a rational man should not only have attempted to build up, but actually did build up a theory ofthe etiology ofall human diseases and their treatment upon such facts, which no one disputes, as that alcohol and opium, if taken in sufficient quantities, will allay pain and stimulate the imagination, would be quite incredible did not every student of the history of medicine know that the various systems and sects in the practice of medicine have been built up and defended on even more ephemeral grounds than these.136
The significance of Brunonianism lay not in its detail, but in the fact that it was a system built, like all systems, on random, uncontrolled, unscientific observation. Because it was a system, it assumed, said Newton, that "the physician not nature cures the disease."''37 Such theories and systems, he said, "form a refuge for the unlearned and narrow medical mind."'138 Further, they "can fool the laity and even arouse the wild enthusiasm of the prejudicial and unthinking practitioner."139 But such "fiat medicine" was not "real medicine". 140 Sadly, he noted, some of Brown's ideas "are still exceedingly potent in the minds not only of the laity, but of the profession."'14' One of these "errors"" was (and here Newton agreed with Richardson's reading but disagreed with the endorsement) that a "vital principle, vital energy or strength" is assigned to every being. 142 Such vitalism was nonsense, "a fundamental and foolish error which is one of the main props of fiat medicine". 143 Progress in medical science, however, was exposing such things for what they were. For instance the consumption of alcoholic beverages, the sheet-anchor of his system, has been steadily decreasing since Brown's day, and this decrease has been notable during the past few years, largely because the white light of science has been turned upon the study of the effects of alcohol upon the human body.'4"
Everywhere, Newton observed, systems, or "fiat medicine", were falling prey to "scientific investigation".145 He concluded:
We still have doctrines and systems and hypothetical explanations of natural phenomena, but the white light of science has grown too strong for us. The medicine of the future will, we believe, not be, like that ofthe past, largely controlled by dogma, superstition and tradition. It will be scientific medicine and the true physician of the future will not be ashamed to say that he does not know a thing that science has not yet made clear to him, and will not condemn an innovation simply because it does not conform to his theories, and because he cannot measure it with his yardstick.146
Newton's account is the one that might be expected from a learned American MD at this time. The essence of Brunonianism was its systematic construction; it was read by this American physician as an object lesson on the evils of populism and the necessity of making experimental science the cornerstone of practice.
My intention in presenting these differing accounts of Brown's career and the career of his writings should now be sufficiently plain. Scrutiny of previous readings of Brown's texts reveals that authors could not agree on their essential meanings; or, put another way, different readers have discerned different essential meanings according to their situation. Even excitability, apparently a key feature of the system, was represented differently by Beddoes and Morrison. Recently historians have begun to turn their attention to these sorts of questions, to study, for example, not the works and influence of some essential John Hunter, but a number of rather different John Hunters made for a specific purpose by subsequent generations, and in turn handed on to us as an apparently uncomplicated object, the father of scientific surgery.147
Similarly, historians have now found that there was not one Newton in the eighteenth century, but many.'48 The discovery that, from day one, Brown's texts were the subject of interpretation does not mean that the modern historian can now return to them and gain privileged access to some putative essential meaning; quite the reverse. It should free the historian from the constraint of having to discover the meanings Brown's texts have for us, and lead to an understanding of the place of Brown and his work in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
